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MEKANISME PENENTU PENDAPATAN PENOREH GETAH PADA ERA PRA 
DAN PASCA KESATUAN SEKERJA 01 SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
Tesis ini mengkaji mekanisme penentu pendapatan penoreh getah di 
Semenanjung Malaysia dalam era pra dan pasca kesatuan sekerja. Ddapati 
pada era pra kesatuan kerja, kadar upah semasa di ekonomi kawasan luar 
bandar India Selatan telah menjadi asas penentuan pendapatan (Kadar upah) 
pekerja estet di Tanah Melayu. Untuk menarik para buruh immigren bekerja di 
estet Tanah Melau, pihak penguatkuasa penjajah pula menambahkan sedikit 
premium ke atas kadar upah kawasan luar bandar tersebut. Sebelum tahun 
1884, kaedah penghitungan premium tersebut dan kaedah upah sebenar 
dibayar kepada para pekerja di estet getah tidaklah diketahui sama-sekali. 
Sejak tahun 1884 hingga tahun 1910, Perundangan lmigresen India telah 
menentukan kadar upah minima berbayar, walaupun asas penetapannya tidak 
jelas. Antara tahun 1910-1923 penentuan kadar upah ditetapkan oleh majikan 
semata-mata sebab pada waktu ini tiada sebarang kawalan kerajaan. Hanya 
pada tahun 1923, satu mekanisme penentuan kadar upah yang lebih formal 
telah diadakan. Pada peringkat ini, sebuah Jawatankuasa lmmigresen India 
(IIC) telah diberi kuasa untuk menetapkan kadar upah di kawasan-kawasan 
yang dianggap sesuai. Jawatankuasa tersebut terdiri daripada ahli yang 
dilantik oleh kerajaan, wakil majikan serta sebuah agensi Kerajaan India yang 
merupakan satu-satunya wakil bagi menyahut suara pihak buruh. Sungguhpun 
XV 
wujudnya kenaikan kadar upah di peringkat ini, namun ianya terlalu sedikit dan 
kenaikannya terdorong atas alasan kos sara hidup buruh, bukannya 
berdasarkan kemakmuran industri getah itu sendiri. Apabila penentuan kadar 
upah dilupuskan pada tahun 1930an, para penoreh getah terpaksa bergantung 
harap dengan para majikan sekali lagi. Bagi memastikan agar kadar upah di 
estet sentiasa kekal di tahap yang rendah; para penguatkuasa penjajah telah 
menambahkan kemasukkan penawaran buruh imigren, terutamanya apabila 
permintaan ke atas buruh di estet Tanah Melayu meningkat. Sebaliknya, 
apabila permintaan menurun ke atas buruh tersebut, lebihannya akan dihantar 
pulang ke negara asal. Dalam era pasca kesatuan sekerja pula, kajian ini. 
mendapati bahawa pendekatan tawar-menawar kolektif telah berjaya membawa 
pelbagai kemajuan baik dari segi pendapatan dan faedah-faedah sampingan 
untuk para penoreh getah; walaupun kedudukan relatif kesatuan kerja tersebut 
agak lemah dan berada dalam persekitaran tawar-menawar yang terhad. 
Namun demikian, pendapatan penoreh getah tetap rendah dan tidak memadai 
bagi menampung kos sara hidup yang sentiasa meningkat. Di antara 
penambahbaikan yang dicadangkan adalah: (i) meningkatkan kadar upah asas 
dari komponon system upah yang sedia ada supaya pekerja dilindungi dari 
factor-faktor di luar kawalannya; (ii) membaiki struktur upah insentif hasil getah 
supaya ianya berubah mengikut peningkatan harga getah pada kadar yang 
tetap; (iii) memeperkenalkan bayaran bonus tahunan berdasarkan keuntungan 
syarikat supaya pekerja dapat berkongsi menikmati kemakmuran syarikat 
XVI 
tersebut; (iv) menawarkan elaun peningkatan kadar upah tahunan ke atas 
kadar upah asas, bagi para pekerja yang telah menjangkau usia yang tua, 
sebagai skim gantirugi bagi tahun-tahun yang tidak mendapat perolehan yang 
baik; (v) menawarkan elaun perumahan untuk semua ahli yang bekerja dan 
yang tidak memeperolehi kemudahan penginapan dan (vi) menetapkan satu 
dasar supaya para majikan industri estet getah menawarkan elaun kos hidup 
secara berasingan terutamanya ketika berlaku inflasi berlandaskan satu pra-
syarat yang ditetapkan secara kolektif. 
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THE EARNINGS DETERMINATION MECHANISM WITH RESPECT TO 
RUBBER TAPPERS IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA IN THE PRE AND POST-
UNION ERAS 
ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to better understand the earnings determining mechanism of 
rubber tappers in the pre and post-union eras in Peninsular Malaysia. It found 
that in the pre-union era, the prevailing wage rate in the South Indian village 
economy formed the basis for determining the payment to estate workers in 
Malaya. The colonial authorities added a small premium to the village wage rate 
to make emigration to Malaya attractive. How this premium was computed and 
the actual wage rate paid to estate workers in Malaya prior to 1884 is unclear. 
But from then on until 1910, Indian Immigration laws determined the minimum 
rates payable, though the basis for the rates is not known. From 1910-1923, 
there was no government control and wage determination remained the 
prerogative of individual groups of planters. In 1923, a formal wage setting 
machinery emerged with the Indian Immigration Committee being empowered 
to fix standard wage rates in areas it thought fit. Composed of government 
appointees and representatives of planters, the Agent of the Government of 
India represented the sole voice of labour. Upward revisions of wages were 
meagre and motivated solely by cost of living arguments-not the prosperity of 
the rubber industry. Wage fixing was virtually abandoned in the 1930s and 
tappers were at the mercy of their employers again. To keep the estate wage 
rate low, the authorities increased the inflow of immigrant labour during periods 
XVlll 
of high labour demand in Malaya while in periods of low demand workers were 
repatriated. In the post-union era, collective bargaining yielded creditable 
improvements in earnings and fringe benefits to rubber tappers, despite the 
relatively weak position of the Union and a restrictive bargaining environment. 
Nonetheless, the earnings of rubber tappers are relatively low and remain 
vulnerable to cost of living increases. Among the improvements suggested 
are:{i) raising the fixed component of the wage system (provided a pre-agreed 
task size is met) to protect workers against factors beyond their control; (ii) 
restructuring the yield incentive such that it increases in a fixed relationship with 
rubber price; (iii) introducing a bonus-style prosperity sharing mechanism to 
give workers a fairer share; (iv) providing annual increments in the basic wage 
rate to reward years of continuous (satisfactory) service so as to compensate 
for the problem of declining earnings faced by aging workers; (v) providing 
housing allowance for all members (instead of just one member) of a working 
household without accommodation and (vi) making it a statutory requirement 
for employers in industries with low earnings to make separate cost of living 
payments when the rate of inflation exceeds a prescribed or pre-agreed 
threshold. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The earnings of rubber tappers have attracted considerable attention in the 
literature 1. At least two reasons account for this; first, the tapper is not separable 
from -the rubber industry that has contributed so much to the prosperity of the 
Malaysian economy since its commercial cultivation in the 1800s. Second, while 
previous studies have shown that the earnings of plantation workers have been 
low, relative to workers of comparable 'skill' in other sectors ( Zulkifly and Ishak, 
1998; Selvakumaran and Bala, 1995), it is not always realized that even within 
the plantation sector, the earnings of the rubber tapper have been among the 
lowest. In 1998, the average monthly earnings of a tapper was RM605.00, 
relative to RM886.00 earned by an oil palm harvester, RM765.00 earned by a 
palm oil mill worker (Category II) and RM612.00 taken home by a rubber 
installation worker. The tapper's earnings generally exceed only those of the 
field workers whose monthly income averaged RM430.00 (Audong and Tan, 
2000: 46; see also Navamukundan and Geetha, 2003: 325-425). However, not 
all studies that have commented on the low earnings of rubber tappers have 
explored the underlying wage determination mechanism, because their main 
concerns lay elsewhere. In fact, there is a general paucity of studies devoted 
1 A sample of works that comment on the wages of Indian labour in the colonial period includes 
Parmer, 1960; Netto, 1961; Jackson, 1961; Sandhu, 1969; Barlow, 1978; and Arasaratnam, 
1979. The works of Gamba, 1962b; Nijhar, 1976; Selvakumaran, 1994 and Ramasamy, 1994, 
for example, extend their attention to the post-colonial period as well. 
1 
solely or primarily to wage issues in the plantation sector. The studies by 
Parmer (1960) and Nijhar (1976) are among the few exceptions. 
The study of the wage determination mechanism of rubber tappers can be 
usefully divided into two periods: the pre- and post-union eras. The pre-union 
era, for the purposes of this study, refers to the period prior to 1954 when 
plantation workers had no national union to represent their interests. The post-
union era refers to the subsequent period (after 1954) that saw the emergence 
of a workers' union in the form of the National Union of Plantation Workers, or 
NUPW. Although the NUPW has remained the sole representative of plantation 
workers, its monopoly position did not imply that it had all plantation workers or 
even a large majority of them as its members at any one time. 
1.2 The Problem Statement 
Two puzzling questions confront anyone interested in understanding the wage 
determining mechanism of rubber tappers in the pre- and post-union eras. First, 
many writers who chronicle the immigration of South Indian workers to the 
rubber estates of Malaya in the pre-union era, and their subsequent depraved 
status therein, do not describe explicitly the mechanism that kept wages low. 
After all, economic theory predicts that continuous immigration from a low wage 
jurisdiction (like South India) to a high labour demand jurisdiction (like pre-
independent Malaya) should equalize the wages in both, and immigration 
should cease. That this has never happened requires some explanation of the 
2 
mechanism that was in operation. Only Parmer (1960) explains the main pieces 
of the mechanism, but he does not interpret them in a holistic labour market 
context. 
Second, writers commenting on the earnings of tappers in the post-union era-
with a few exceptions- continue to harp on the fact that nominal wages had 
either not improved or improved very little, and that rises in the cost of living had 
wiped out whatever real gains the worker had expected (see Selvakumaran, 
1994: 261-300 and Ramasamy, 1994: 135-170, for example). The blame is then 
put squarely on the shoulders of the NUPW, the sole representative of 
plantation workers during the post-union era. But these studies also spend little 
or no time examining the bargaining framework, the limitations and strengths of 
the Union's bargaining position and its relative gains and losses in the 
bargaining process. For if the workers had consistently been at the losing end, 
the Union could not have survived to this day. True, there were no alternative 
unions to go to, but the worker could have still chosen to remain outside the 
Union. 
Neither of these questions is answered fully by the various works that touch 
upon the wages of tappers in both eras. This study hopes to fill these gaps in 
the literature. 
3 
1.3 Objectives of Study 
This study has the following objectives: 
1. To investigate and explain the process that determined and maintained a 
low wage rate that nevertheless attracted an uninterrupted flow of 
workers from South India to the estates in Malaya in the pre-union era. 
2. To examine the earnings determination mechanism in the post-union era. 
More specifically, the collective bargaining framework and the bargaining 
power of the Union will be considered carefully before an evaluation of 
the gains and losses in the bargaining process is attempted. 
3. To suggests improvements in the payment systems for rubber tappers, in 
the light of the findings of the study, 
The wage (earnings) determination mechanism of rubber tappers can be 
usefully divided into two periods: the pre- and post-union eras. The pre-union 
era refers to the period prior to 1954 when plantation workers had no national 
union to represent their interests. The post-union era refers to the subsequent 
period that saw the emergence of a workers' union in the form of the NUPW. 
The union negotiated on behalf of the workers with the employer's association, 
originally known as the Malayan Planting Industries Employers' Association 
(MPIEA) and, subsequently, as the Malayan Agricultural Producers' Association 
(MAPA). 
To keep the study manageable, it will confine itself to wages and fringe benefits, 
leaving aside a host of other areas that critics have argued are also the domain 
4 
of a union, and where they saw little or no improvements. It will also limit itself to 
the MAPA/NUPW wage system. There is a separate wage setting mechanism 
for tappers in the Rubber Research Institute's experimental station. This is so 
limited that it has no relevance to the settings outside it. 
1.4 Data Sources and General Methodology 
The primary sources of information are the collective agreements and awards 
concluded between the NUPW and the employers' association. A complete set 
was kindly made available to the writer by both the Union and the Association. 
Much of the background information, supplementary materials and statistical 
data were drawn from published sources, as will be acknowledged where 
appropriate. However, they were collected from scattered sources such as the 
libraries of Universiti Sains Malaysia, University Malaya, Universiti Putra 
Malaysia, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, and from the relevant government 
agencies in Putrajaya. 
In line with the objectives of the study, several methodological approaches were 
used. For the pre-union era, factual evidence gathered from existing sources 
was used for two purposes. First, to create the setting of the period and, 
second, to construct a stylised economic model from which plausible predictions 
were drawn. Evidence was then marshalled to demonstrate that the predictions 
were borne out in reality. This helped to demonstrate the workings of the wage 
determination mechanism of that period. 
5 
Analysis of the post-union era was conducted at both micro and macro levels. In 
the micro level analysis, collective agreements were examined to identify the 
main payments that were conceded through bargaining. Since most of the 
concessions only benefited tappers when rubber price exceeded prescribed 
thresholds, the prevailing rubber price for the duration of each agreement was 
scrutinized to determine if workers gained or lost from these concessions. For 
the macro level analysis, time series data were used to analyse the movements 
of important aggregates that influenced the earnings of rubber tappers. These 
include rubber price, labour productivity and the yield per hectare. This was 
complemented with regression analysis that tested the strength and direction of 
the relationship between the growth of the earnings of tappers and factors such 
as rubber price, labour productivity and land productivity. Complete data series 
were, however, only available for the period 1971-2004. 
1.5 A Brief Review of Relevant Literature 
A vast literature exists on the early immigration of Indian labour to Malaya (later 
Malaysia) and the appalling conditions that they suffered in the plantations and 
elsewhere. Some of these studies relate to the Indian community in Malaya and 
their early development, and make these observations only as part of a larger 
picture that they were concerned with (Netto, 1961; Arasaratnam, 1979; 
Rajeswary, 1981 ). 
Some others, however, focus primarily on the role of immigrant Indian labour in 
the development of Malaya. Among these are the studies by Jackson (1961) 
6 
and Sandhu (1969). These accounts are largely confined to the pre-union era 
as defined in this study (that is, prior to 1954). Sandhu's (1969) work deals 
solely with Indian immigrant labour is concerned with developments in the 19th 
century. Jackson (1961 ), on the other hand, discusses Indian immigrant labour 
only as a part of a larger study of the role of immigrants in Malaya's 
development between 1786-1920. However, both authors document, in different 
degrees, the poor working conditions of Indian labour and the low wages they 
received relative to Chinese workers doing the same tasks. However, neither of 
them concerned themselves with the wage determination mechanism that 
resulted in such low wages and kept them low. The same can be said of the 
work of Stenson (1970) on the early industrial conflict in Malaya that chronicles 
the activities of radical left-wing trade unions prior to 1948. His later work 
(Stenson, 1980) sought to illustrate the structure and functioning of colonial and 
post-colonial order in Malaya, using the Indian community as a case study. But 
only the historical material on early trade union activity is directly relevant to the 
present study. He, too, does not devote any attention to the bargaining process 
or mechanisms. 
The work of Parmer (1960) is more enlightening in this respect. He offers a 
detailed description of how colonial labour policy, both in Malaya and India, 
jointly determined the wage rate for Indian workers in the plantations. This work 
provides an excellent chronology of the wage fixing process between 1910 and 
1941. Being a historian, however, he did not look at it from an economic 
modelling perspective. Instead, the detailed accounts that he offers, drawn from 
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colonial records, forms the main building blocks of the wage determining 
mechanism in the pre-union era discussed in Chapter 4. Unfortunately, his 
study ends in 1941, well before the post-union era began. 
With respect to the post- union era, the study by Gamba (1962a) on the origin of 
trade unionism in Malaya captures the events prior to the development of non-
communist led unions in Malaya. His other work (Gamba, 1962b) traces the 
history and development of the NUPW; in doing so, he gives a good account of 
the beginnings of the collective bargaining process in the plantation sector and 
the early achievements and failures of the Union. Nonetheless, his accounts do 
not extend to activities beyond 1958, and covers just four years of the Union's 
efforts after it signed its first collective bargaining agreement with the employers' 
association in 1954. 
The only work that focuses primarily on wage determination issues in the post-
union era is Nijhar's (1976). Apart from providing a description of the negotiating 
framework, and the negotiating parties, he conducts a detailed examination of 
the main outcomes of all collective agreements and awards from 1954 to 1964. 
And despite the disdain shown by writers like Jain (1970) and Stenson (1980) 
towards the accommodative bargaining style of the NUPW, Nijhar (1976) 
concludes that the Union was chiefly responsible for improvements in the 
conditions of estate workers since 1954. Even so, Nijhar's work suffers from 
several shortcomings. First and most obvious, is the fact that it is dated and 
contains no evaluation of all the collective agreements and awards after 1964. 
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Second, although Nijhar described the negotiating parties, he did not evaluate 
their relative bargaining strengths. An understanding of the strength of the 
bargaining parties allows for a more realistic appreciation of the outcomes. 
Third, Nijhar's focus was micro; he did not offer any macro perspective on the 
movement of productivity and earnings of workers over time. The present study 
seeks to extend Nijhar's post-union era analyses of collective agreements and 
awards, taking into account the changes in the bargaining framework and 
relative strengths of the bargaining parties. Furthermore, the micro level 
analyses of bargaining outcomes will be supplemented with macro analyses of 
the movements in labour productivity and earnings. 
Other recent studies on Indian plantation labour have devoted some attention to 
wages and conditions of living among rubber tappers (Selvakumaran, 1994 
Ramasamy, 1994 ). In the course of pursuing a larger subject, they have paused 
to examine bargaining outcomes and evaluate the Union's efforts. 
Selvakumaran (1994 ), for example, scrutinized the collective agreements from 
1954 to 1990 and a host of other aspects that he presumed to be within the 
range of the Union to influence. However, he devoted very little attention to the 
wage determination process and the institutional constraints faced by the Union. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, he was highly critical of the perceived failures of the 
Union, and gave it no credit, even in little areas where the improvements were 
too obvious to ignore. In fact, several of his findings are evaluated in this study 
and shown to be either inaccurate or incomplete. 
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The other work by Ramasamy (1994) also had a wider theme than the 
determination of the wages of tappers. Nonetheless, he, too, examines the 
collective agreements, although his analysis is less exhaustive because it ends 
with a so-called collective agreement of 1965, when no such agreement exists! 
Ramasamy (1994) also finds very little to credit the Union with. Some of his 
conclusions are questionable and are examined in this study. 
1.6 Limitations of the Study 
This study suffers from several limitations: 
First, it is confined to an analysis of the earnings and fringe benefits of rubber 
tappers in estates, for reasons stated in the Introduction. In doing so, however, 
it ignores other types of workers in the rubber industry, like field workers, factory 
workers and so forth. Including them would have widened the scope of this 
study beyond the time and resources available. 
Second, although the focus is on the estate sector, not all estates are unionised 
nor are all of them members of the Malayan Agricultural Producers Association 
(MAPA). Thus, studying the collective agreements and awards between the 
NUPW and MAPA (in the post-union era) only allows conclusions to be drawn 
about tappers in MAPA member estates, not those outside it. Wages and 
benefits in non-MAPA estates are usually inferior (Nijhar, 1976: 7; Ramasamy, 
1994: 141-42). 
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Third, bargaining theories also concerns themselves with the trade off between 
higher wages and lower employment. High wages for the resident workforce 
can make substitution with foreign labour attractive. This aspect is not 
considered in great depth. The growing presence of foreign labour in the estate 
sector is interesting in its own right and deseNes a separate study. 
Fourth, the macro data on the earnings of estate workers suffers a few 
drawbacks. They include the earnings of tappers who are non-unionised, those 
in non-MAPA member estates as well as field workers; since all these groups 
earn less than tappers in MAPA member estates, their inclusion is likely to 
understate average earnings per worker. Furthermore, the value of fringe 
benefits has also not been quantified and included in the published data. 
Finally, much of the statistical analysis of the impact of union bargaining is 
limited to the 1971-2004 period due to the lack of a continuous data series for 
some key variables like wages and productivity. Furthermore, in computing the 
real value of earnings, 1971 was chosen as the base year to deflate current 
earnings (in Chapter 6); Since consumption patterns are unlikely to remain 
unchanged over long periods of time, the real earnings for periods that are 
further removed from the base year are likely to be severely understated. 
1. 7 Organization of Subsequent Chapters 
The rest of the study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 looks at two 
interrelated issues: the first provides a theoretical perspective of the main 
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features of the time rate and piece rate payment systems that are widely used 
in agrarian settings and the circumstances under which one is likely to be 
preferred over the other. The second issue that is examined is the process of 
determining the rate of payment, regardless of which method of payment is 
adopted. The insights gained from the theoretical discussions in this chapter 
enable a better appreciation of the empirical analyses undertaken in Chapters 4 
and5. 
Chapter 3, designed to provide a background of the rubber estate sector, is 
divided into three parts. The first traces briefly the history of the rubber industry 
in Malaysia. The second reviews the main trends of some key variables in the 
rubber industry, such as rubber price, worker productivity and land yields, over a 
more recent period (1971-2004). Since a rubber tapper's incentive payments are 
also tied to these factors, the review enables a better grasp of the results of 
collective bargaining discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The final section describes 
a rubber tapper's daily routine and the various components of his daily earnings. 
Many of these tasks are called by names peculiar to the rubber estate economy 
and an early familiarity with the tasks and their associated names will enable a 
better understanding of the negotiated gains of the worker, discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
Chapter 4 attempts to explain the process of wage determination in the pre-
union era. It begins by providing the setting in which Indian labour was recruited 
to work in the plantations. Based on this, an economic model is developed; it 
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demonstrates how the manipulation of the inflow of labour from India kept 
wages in Malaya low. Additionally, isolating the wage rate of Indian workers in 
the estates from the influences of domestic labour demand and supply enabled 
the government (and other interested parties) to alter it in directions they saw fit. 
Chapter 5 turns to the earnings determining mechanisms in the post-union era. 
It opens by describing briefly the trade union activities in the post-war period 
that culminated in the formation of the employers' body and a national union 
representing plantation workers. The subsequent part of the chapter outlines 
the main contents of all the collective agreements forged between these two 
bodies, beginning from the first agreement in 1954 to the one currently in force, 
but signed in 2003. This provides the basis for the critical evaluation of the 
collective agreements that follows in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 is the heart of the study. It begins by fleshing out the simple bilateral 
monopoly model (presented in Chapter 2) with a discussion of the bargaining 
framework in place, the factors that determine the relative strengths of the 
employers' association and the Union, and the role of the government. This is 
followed by an objective but critical evaluation of the performance of the Union. 
Previous criticisms levelled at the Union's efforts are also examined critically. 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of the study and makes some 
recommendations to improve the payment system for rubber tappers. 
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CHAPTER2 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND WAGE DETERMINATION IN ESTATES: 
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates two interrelated issues: the theory guiding the two 
methods of payments widely used in agrarian economies and the determination 
of the wage rate, regardless of the method of payment adopted. 
Piece rates and time rates are two methods of compensation that are commonly 
employed in agricultural activities. The rubber estates in Malaysia are no 
exception. The first part of this chapter provides a theoretical perspective of the 
main features of the two systems and the circumstances under which an 
employer is likely to choose one or the other. 
Irrespective of which method of compensation is used, the rate of payment must 
be decided upon. How exactly will this rate be determined? Two scenarios need 
to be investigated with respect to the estate sector. In the pre-union era, market 
forces set the wage rate, at least in theory. Thus, a competitive model seems 
appropriate. In the post-union era, the basic wage rate and other payments 
were determined through collective bargaining. Given a wide range of 
bargaining models available, the bilateral monopoly model was adopted not 
only because it reflected the situation in the plantation sector but because it 
recognizes explicitly the wage-employment trade-off in bargaining. 
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The insights gained from the theoretical discussions in this chapter will be used 
in the empirical analyses undertaken in subsequent chapters (especially 
Chapters 4 and 5). 
2.2 Methods of Payment: Piece Rate and Time Rate 
Two modes of payment are widely used, especially (though not exclusively) in 
agriculture. They are piece rates and time rates (Lazear, 1986: 405-430; 1998: 
98-119). A piece rate rewards labour according to some measure of the 
worker's output, whereas a time rate compensates a worker based on the 
number of hours allocated to the job (Borjas, 1996: 402). Under a time rate, 
time on the job is used as the unit of measuring input (or as the proxy for effort). 
Under a piece rate, compensation of a worker is a function of output or: 
Wt=f (qJ 
where Wt is compensation for period t, and qtis a worker's output in period t. 
On the other hand, compensation under a time rate is a function of input (or 
effort), usually measured by time allocated to the job, or: 
Wt=g (EJ 
where Wt and Et are compensation and (some measure of) effort in period t, 
respectively. 
Piece rates are often viewed as incentive pay because earnings are dependent 
on individual output (Seiler, 1984: 363-376), whereas time rate earnings are 
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solely a function of hours worked. The International Labour Organization (ILO) 
offers a different perspective: time rates are payments to employees who are 
redeemed hourly, daily, weekly or monthly, while piece rates are paymenst for 
workers who complete specific steps in the production process (ILO, 1984: 1-
164 and Sajhau 1986: 79). The piece rate system is now more popularly 
referred to as payment by results (PBR). In short, a piece rate and a time rate 
represent a payment by output and a payment by input respectively (Dobb 
1959: 50-55; Paarsch and Shearer, 1997: 1-2; Shearer, 2003: 1-3) 
2. 3 Piece Rates or Time Rates? 
Output based pay has several advantages (Lazear, 1998: 98-119). First, the 
inherent strength of an output based pay system is that it discourages 
unproductive workers from applying for the job and induces inefficient workers 
to leave. This can be illustrated by examining the choice faced by a tapper in 
deciding between an estate offering payment on the basis of output (piece rate) 
and one that pays a fixed monthly salary (time rate). This two payment systems 
are reflected by schedules 8 and A respectively in Figure 2.1. 
Schedule A represents a time rate payment while schedule 8 represents a 
piece rate payment. Assume that 60 sen is paid for each kilogram of latex 
collected under scheme B. Under scheme A (the time rate wage scheme), the 
weekly salary is fixed at RM 180, regardless of the amount of latex collected1. 
What would be the worker's choice? 
1 Of course, this can only be a short-term arrangement. If the worker consistently collects a very 
small amount of latex, he will be terminated. 
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Wage Rate 
RM/week 
180 
0 300 Kgs. of latex tapped 
Figure 2.1: The Screening Effect of Output Related Wage 
Source: Lazear (1998: 1 00) 
If the worker is able to tap and collect more than 300kg of latex each week, he 
will opt for the piece rate scheme since his takings will exceed RM 180 per 
week. On the other hand, a less productive job-seeker who is unable or 
unwilling to tap and collect at least 300kg of latex a week will choose the time 
rate scheme that offers a fixed weekly income of RM180. The piece rate 
scheme, therefore, attracts more productive or better motivated workers. The 
less motivated and less productive workers will seek employment with 
employers offering a time rate paying scheme. 
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However, Baland et. al (1999: 445-461) express a slightly different view. While 
they agree that a piece rate contract attracts the most able workers, they point 
out that it draws the least able ones as well. Only workers with medium level 
ability opt for the time rate. A highly able worker can choose his own level of 
effort, under the piece rate, to earn a higher level of earnings per day than is 
possible under a time rate contract. By the same token, a less able worker will 
also be drawn to a piece rate system, despite the prospect of lower earnings 
per day, because the time rate contract requires an effort level beyond his 
ability. 
The second strength of the piece rate scheme is that it motivates workers by 
providing them a direct incentive to boost individual effort. This is readily seen 
from Figure 2.1 above. A tapper seeking to maximize his weekly earnings will 
opt for the piece rate scheme (B) because by tapping and collecting more than 
300 kg. of latex per week he can earn more than RM180 per week. Scheme B, 
therefore, provides him with a direct incentive to work harder or to put in more 
effort. A less productive or unmotivated tapper would choose scheme A that 
guarantees a (safe) fixed weekly salary of RM180. Of course, if his collection of 
latex consistently falls below 300 kg. per week, he runs the risk of being 
terminated from the job. 
Third, even if more productive workers are attracted to a piece rate scheme, not 
all workers under the scheme will have identical abilities. Nevertheless, it can be 
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shown that under a piece rate system, a more able worker will indeed produce 
more output than his less able counterpart2. 
Let us assume that a rational worker will choose that level of output that will 
maximize his utility. Utility is assumed to increase with the net pay that in turn, 
depends on output produced. The greater the output produced, the greater will 
be ihe net pay, and the higher will be the worker's utility. A utility maximizing 
worker will produce until the point where the marginal gain (revenue) from the 
additional unit produced (or additional effort) will just offset the marginal cost of 
putting the additional effort (to produce that unit). 
If the payment for each unit of output produced is given by w, the marginal 
revenue (MR) from each unit of output will be constant and equal to w. The 
horizontal line labeled MR in Figure 2.2 shows this. 
The marginal cost of producing output (MC) is the disutility suffered in allocating 
time away from other pleasurable activities to work. The MC of effort will rise as 
more output is produced because more leisure is sacrificed in favour of work. 
Furthermore, the MC of effort of a more able worker (MCA) will be lower than the 
MC of a less able worker (MC) as shown in the figure. 
The utility maximizing worker will choose that level of output (effort) where the 
MR from the additional output is equal to the MC of producing the output. For 
2 The analysis that follows is based on Borjas (1996: 403-404). 
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the less able worker, this is given by the level of output q* whereas the more 
able worker will produce a larger output (qable). 
Wage Rate 
RM 
0 
MC 
q* 
MC able 
MR 
q able Output 
Figure 2.2: The Allocation of Work Effort by Piece Rate Workers 
Source: Borjas (1996:404) 
Thus, a piece rate system not only attracts more productive workers, but also 
motivates the more able among them to produce a higher output than the less 
able ones. 
Let us now examine the time rate system. How much effort will time rate 
workers allocate to their jobs? Assume that in order to earn a fixed rate of pay, 
a minimum level of output (q*) is required of them. The worker will thus, be 
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motivated to produce this minimum output level and no more. The worker will be 
terminated if he does not meet this minimum, but there is no additional incentive 
to exceed q*. Thus, under the time rate, workers, regardless of their ability, will 
tend to produce similar output levels. 
Fourth, piece rate contracts may simply be better contracts in a sense that they 
present a mutually beneficial arrangement to workers and employers. It has an 
in built motivation to the former to choose their own pace of work and earnings. 
It is an advantage to the latter when it obviates the need for supervision. This 
savings in monitoring costs can occur only if the quality of output is unlikely to 
vary much and/or productivity is easily measurable. 
The fifth advantage of the piece rate scheme is that it is useful for sorting 
productive workers from their less productive counterparts. Figure 2.3 below 
illustrates this point. The figure is drawn to show the payment schemes of two 
estates, X and Y. It is assumed that estate X pays the rubber tapper the full 
marginal profit while estate Y pays him only 60 percent of the marginal profit. It 
is clear from the figure that estate Y pays a 60 percent lower rate for every kg.of 
latex tapped and collected, but guarantees a minimum amount of RM60 per 
week (time rate). 
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Wage Rate 
(RM/week) 
60 
y 
300 Kg. of latex tapped 
Figure 2.3: The Sorting Effect of Output Related Wage 
Source: Lazear (1998: 104) 
X 
Any worker planning to tap and collect more than 300 kgs. of latex per week, 
will prefer to work in estate X. They will be sacrificing the guaranteed minimum 
payment in exchange for receiving the full marginal revenue from each 
additional kg. of latex collected. In contrast, those who are less hardworking will 
choose to work in estate Y. Given that they do not plan to tap and collect more 
than 300kg. of latex per week, estate Y's scheme would be more attractive to 
them. Hence, an estate that pays the full marginal revenue attracts high 
productivity workers while an estate that pays workers less than the full amount 
of the marginal revenue runs the risk of attracting only low productivity workers. 
To summarize, the piece rate system attracts the most able workers, elicits high 
levels of effort from the work force, ties pay directly to performance (thus, 
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minimizing the role of discrimination and nepotism) and increases the firm's 
productivity (Borjas, 1996: 406). 
If so many advantages prevail, why are piece rate schemes not adopted more 
widely? Several factors militate against the universal adoption of the piece rate 
scheme (Borjas, 1996: 402-403). One reason is that the incentive effect 
inher-ent in the scheme is of little use when the employer's production depends 
on team effort. Offering piece rates to one of the workers along a production line 
would have little impact on his productivity since the speed at which the line 
moves also depends on the productivity of all the other workers on the line. 
Although it might be possible to structure compensation so as to offer a piece 
rate to the entire team based on the team's output, this introduces the danger of 
some members of the team 'free riding' on the effort of others. Piece rate 
systems therefore, work best when the worker's own pay can be tied directly to 
his own productivity. 
A piece rate system, by overemphasizing the quantity of output produced, may 
sacrifice quality. In the typical piece rate system, there is a strong incentive to 
trade off quality for quantity since payment hinges on the latter. Insisting that the 
worker's earnings will depend on his output meeting a well-defined quality 
standard, could minimize the problem. But incorporating both quality and 
quantity standards in the payment formula would increase the employer's 
monitoring costs and reduce the attractiveness of the piece rate systems to the 
employer. 
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The fact that earnings can fluctuate considerably under a piece rate system also 
undermines its attraction to workers. For example, in the rubber estates, the 
amount of latex collected depends on weather conditions, the age of the tree, 
the terrain and others. These factors, outside the control of the tapper, can 
affect his earnings significantly even if there is no lack of effort on his part. This 
uncertainty in earnings level is absent under the time rate mode. 
A related question is: who should bear the risk of any fluctuation income? If pay 
is output-based, the worker assumes the risk and a risk-averse worker will avoid 
working under such an arrangement. On the other hand, under a time rate 
system, the firm assumes the risk and it will attract risk-averse workers. 
Lazear (1998: 119) argues that 'other things being equal, it is better to have the 
firm bear the risk'. This is because firstly, firms are generally in a better position 
to diversify the risk by pooling it with other projects or by selling it to a third party 
through the capital market. Apart from diversifying, firms can also conduct 
arbitrage to protect themselves from wild fluctuations in output or in the prices of 
their input and output. 
Second, workers find it more difficult to deal with the risk. Workers, particularly 
those with low wages, have liabilities such as food, housing, clothing and other 
expenses that are relatively fixed. Hence, any variation in their income is likely 
to cause significant difficulties for them and their families. But highly paid 
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